Employment of Crash-Rated Active Vehicle Barriers

1. Physical security is critical to 
ensuring mission readiness and the safety and security of 
Marines, service members, their families, and civilians 
aboard Marine Corps sites. Access control is a key element
of physical security, ensuring only authorized personnel 
and visitors gain access to our sites and installations. 
Drivers of vehicles that breach the site security perimeter
Entry Control Facility (ECF)/Access Control Point (ACP) 
without authorization pose a threat to site security 
personnel, occupants of the installation, and the assets 
and resources supporting Fleet Marine Force missions. The 
employment of crash-rated active vehicle barriers (AVBs),
also identified as Final Denial Barriers, are highly 
effective in preventing breaches when such barriers are 
present, operable, and properly installed as outlined 
below. This MARADMIN implements reference (a), reinforces 
unauthorized installation access guidelines, and provides 
guidance on the employment of crash-rated active vehicle 
barriers during installation access control operations. 
This MARADMIN addresses required notifications, as 
directed in reference (a), for AVBs that are improperly 
placed and AVBs that are inoperable for more than 30 total 
days in a 12-month period.
2. Background. Marine Corps site perimeter access control 
requirements contained in reference (b) require all 
persons entering Marine Corps sites to have their identity 
established and verified, be determined fit for access, 
and establish a purpose for access. 
3. Unauthorized Installation Access. Reference (c) 
addresses unauthorized installation access and provides: 
3.A. Attempted unauthorized installation access is defined
as one or more individuals attempting to enter the 
installation without both completing the proper access 
control procedure and being granted access by security 
personnel, regardless of their intent. 
3.B. Successful unauthorized installation access is 
defined as one or more individuals proceeding past the 
final point at which they would be forced to stop, such as 
by a crash-rated vehicle or denial barrier at an entry 
control point or by a perimeter fence or wall, regardless 
of their intent.
3.C. Administrative stops, by a non-rated barrier (e.g., 
concrete/jersey barriers, tire shredders, etc.) or 
pursuing security forces, are considered a successful 
unauthorized installation access if they occur past the 
final point at which they would be forced to stop (i.e., 
beyond the site ECF/ACP). 
3.D. Reference (d) identifies that an attempt to enter the
installation includes proceeding in the direction onto the
installation, past the point where the individual first 
begins the access control process required in references 
(b) and (e). 
3.E. Reference (d) notes that an individual who is denied
access during the access control process and departs the
installation through a turnaround conducted under the 
continuous control of security personnel is not considered
to have attempted to access the installation.  
4. Employment of crash-rated AVBs. Reference (a) provides 
that an AVB is a barrier that can be configured to either 
permit or deny entry of a vehicle and can be quickly 
switched between two configurations through an action by 
security personnel; and employment of an AVB is taking 
action to switch an AVB to the configuration in which a 
vehicle is denied entry. Reference (a) further notes:
4.A. Site commanders are responsible for ensuring security 
personnel are able to quickly, confidently, and 
appropriately employ any crash-rated AVBs present at the 
installation to mitigate threats, control access to the 
installation, and protect the installation and its 
personnel. DoD analysis of reporting of attempted and 
successful unauthorized installation access events show 
that security personnel often do not employ present, 
operable AVBs during the events and these decisions often
lead to unauthorized 
installation access resulting in the breach of the 
installation perimeter when it could reasonably have been 
prevented. 
4.B. A crash-rated AVB is not likely to cause death or 
serious bodily harm when it is properly placed, which 
means when it is placed in a manner that a typical 
approaching driver is likely able to see it with 
sufficient time and distance to slow or stop before 
contacting the AVB. Factors that determine whether a 
crash-rated AVB is properly placed include, but are not 
limited to, lighting, signage, the barrier's paint scheme 
and the barriers physical location relative to the 
ECF/ACP. There remains a risk of collateral 
damage to vehicles and occupants other than the intended 
target when an AVB is deployed. Site security personnel 
must maintain awareness of drivers of vehicles in adjacent 
lanes who may be unaware of the AVB activation and may 
still face risks due to the limited time they have to 
react. This risk can be reduced through training and 
methods outlined in reference (f). Reference (f) provides 
guidance related to the planning, design, and further 
requirements for an ECF/ACP while reference (g) provides 
guidance for planning, design, construction, and 
maintenance of vehicle barriers, to include AVBs. 
5. Employment of AVBs. Reference (a) directs:
5.A. Site security personnel at an ECF/ACP in the United 
States will employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB that
is present and operable when the apparent intent of a 
driver of an inbound vehicle is to breach the installation 
security perimeter without authorization, unless security 
personnel can determine and clearly articulate how:
5.A.1. The driver does not pose a threat; or
5.A.2. The use of a crash-rated AVB would not be 
objectively reasonable based on the totality of the 
circumstances, including the visibility of the AVB at the
time of the breach.
5.B. Site security personnel will be expected to 
specifically articulate the rationale behind their
decision not to employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB, 
and when their decisions are not objectively reasonable, 
commanders must direct remedial training. 
5.C. Commanders should consider appropriate disciplinary 
or administrative actions for security personnel who 
inexplicably or unreasonably fail to employ AVBs in such 
a manner consistent with this guidance on a repeated basis.
5.D. Commanders, with support from the site Provost 
Marshal, Police Chief, or Security Officer, and servicing 
legal office will establish, maintain, and regularly train 
security personnel on:
5.D.1. Standards for determining objective reasonableness 
when using force consistent with the law, and 
references (h), (i) and (j);
5.D.2. Procedures for the employment of all crash-rated 
AVBs present at the site, including AVB response and 
cycle times; and
5.D.3. Circumstances and situations which would preclude 
the employment of a properly placed crash-rated AVB.
5.E. Testing. Site commanders are responsible for properly 
maintaining AVBs and will ensure AVBs are tested at least 
monthly in accordance with reference (a). Tests will be 
recorded manually or electronically, and records will be 
maintained in accordance with reference (j).
6. Required Notifications. 
6.A. As directed in reference (a), the following 
notifications are required:
6.A.1. Within 30 days of a determination that a present, 
operable crash-rated AVB is improperly placed; and/or 
6.A.2. It is determined that a crash-rated AVB present at 
the installation has been inoperable for more than 30 days 
in any 12 month period. 
6.A.3. Marine Corps Sites
6.A.3.A. Marine Corps Installations. For the incidents 
outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2, commanders are 
required to notify the Deputy Commandant (DC) 
Installations and Logistics (I&L) (COMMCICOM G3) and the 
DC Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Protection 
Branch (POP) at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the 
Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), including the 
chain of command. Service Level Training Installations 
will ensure that the CG TECOM is included in all 
notifications. COMMCICOM G3 is further required to notify 
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD) 
Intelligence and Security (I&S), via 
e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization mailbox:
osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical-security@mail
.mil, upon notification, and include the PP&O, Operations 
Division Protection Branch, Physical Security 
organizational organization mailbox at 
ppo_pop_physicalsecurity@usmc.mil. 
6.A.3.B. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) Sites. For the 
incidents outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2,
commanders are required to notify the Commander, MARFORRES
(COMMARFORRES) and the DC PP&O, Protection Branch (POP), 
at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the AMHS, including the 
chain of command. COMMARFORRES is further required to 
notify OUSD I&S, via e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization 
mailbox: -osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical-
security@mail.mil, upon notification, and include the 
PP&O, Operations Division Protection Branch, Physical 
Security organizational mailbox: 
ppo_pop_physicalsecurity@usmc.mil.
6.B. Notifications are intended to facilitate the 
development of a corrective action plan.
7. Coordination. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with 
the DC I&L, CG TECOM, COMMARFORRES, and Headquarters 
Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division. 
8. Administration and Logistics
8.A. Guidance contained in this MARADMIN will be included 
into the references (i) and (l) update.  
8.B. Commanders at sites outside of the United States will
coordinate and deconflict the contents of this MARADMIN 
with the appropriate Geographical Combatant Commands and 
Sub-Unified Command.
8.C. This MARADMIN is applicable to the Total Force.
8.D. This MARADMIN shall remain in effect until the 
contents of this MARADMIN are incorporated into the update
to references (i) and (k). 
8.E. Commanders will ensure all measures are integrated 
into and synchronized with their Antiterrorism Plans in 
accordance with reference (m).
8.F. Commanders are reminded that reporting of all 
incursions is required and will be conducted in accordance
with references (n) and (o).
9. Release authorized by Lieutenant General J. W. Bierman, 
Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.